There are four chapters devoted to the four axial civilizations: Ancient Egypt, Greece, India and China. Our readers may be especially interested in the chapter on early China, (a long chapter of 82 pages), plus a section on Shang and Western Zhou China in an earlier chapter. Bellah is best known for his 1985 co-authored book Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American life. However, not many people know that Bellah’s original field is actually East Asian studies. His PhD degree is a joined one from the department of sociology and the department of what was then called “Far Eastern Language” at Harvard University, and his dissertation was later published as Tokugawa Religion: the Cultural Roots of Modern Japan. What is even more interesting is that Bellah’s study of America is informed and shaped by his study of East Asia. For example, his 1967 essay “Civil Religion in America,” which made him famous and turned him eventually into an Americanist, was particularly influenced by his study of religions in East Asia. In December 2011, I attended a conference in honor of Bellah at the City University of Hong Kong, organized by P. J. Ivanhoe and Sungmoon Kim. The conference is called “A Habit of the Heart: Confucianism and Contemporary East Asian Cultures,” and it’s one of the most intellectually stimulating conferences I’ve been to.

I have written two short essays on Bellah’s book. Here are the links to them:

http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2011/12/09/beyond-reductive-naturalism/

http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2011/12/15/the-return-of-the-grand-narrative/

Philosophy East and West, vol. 62, no. 1 (2012)

ARTICLES

Parasitism and Disjunctivism in Nyāya Epistemology
Matthew R. Dasti, 1

This article examines a number of arguments I collectively term arguments from parasitism, which Nyāya employs to illustrate that rational reflection, the institution of language, and even error itself presuppose a ground-level basis of veridical cognitive interaction with the world. It further suggests that by such arguments, coupled with its stress on the inerrancy of pramāṇas, Nyāya anticipates and supports the contemporary philosophical movement known as (epistemological) disjunctivism.

Theory and Comparison in the Discussion of Buddhist Ethics
Michael G. Barnhart, 16

Comparisons between the ethical views of Western and non-Western thinkers have been a staple of comparative philosophy for quite some time now. Some of these comparisons, such as between the views of Aristotle and Confucius, seem especially apt and revealing. However, is it really so obvious that Western “ethical theory”― virtue ethics, deontology, or consequentialism ― is always the best lens through which to approach non-Western ethical thought in general and Buddhism in particular? The existence of more indigenous accounts of Buddhist ethics raises other questions. Does Buddhism bring something unique to the table, perhaps stretching the way in which we think about ethics generally? Or, does Buddhism represent a variant, perhaps a unique and informative one, of a cluster of approaches? Does it stand alone or in a theoretical family? This essay attempts to answer these questions by examining some of Buddhism’s more unique elements as well as the nature of the various standard ethical theories to see whether they at least exhibit the same spirit of approach endemic to Buddhism. I argue that, by and large, they do not.

The Unsolved Issue of Consciousness
Nishida Kitarō, translated with an introduction by John W. M. Krummel, 44

This essay by Nishida Kitarō from 1927, translated into English here for the first time, is from the initial period of what has come to be called “Nishida philosophy” (Nishida tetsugaku), when Nishida was first developing his conception of “place” (basho). Nishida here inquires into the relationship between logic and consciousness in terms of place and implacement in order to overcome the shortcomings of previous philosophical attempts ― from the ancient Greeks to the moderns ― to dualistically conceive the relationship between being and knowing in terms of subject-object or form-matter. During the course of articulating his novel approach to consciousness and cognition, Nishida discusses what he takes to be the weaknesses of Greek hylomorphism, Kantian (and neo-Kantian) dualism, and Husserlian phenomenology. Dissatisfied with the attribution of mere passivity to placiality, and turning away from consciousness objectified as a subject of statement, Nishida imparts to consciousness qua place a certain logical independence as an active yet un-objectifiable “predicate.” This investigation of consciousness as the unobjectifiable place for objectification leads Nishida to the notion of what precedes consciousness itself, a “place of nothing” (mu no basho) that envelops the dichotomized structures of subject-predicate, being-nothing, subject-object, universal-particular, et cetera.

Mohist Care
Dan Robins, 60

This essay refutes the widely held view that the Mohist doctrine of inclusive care (jian ai 兼愛) rules out any special preference for those close to us, especially family. Family values such as filial piety were in fact extremely important for the Mohists, as is clear even in their writings on inclusive care. Caring inclusively involved taking up a social perspective by committing oneself to collective norms that, if widely followed, would secure everybody’s well-being. This would not be a pure form of altruism, since many people would be able to care inclusively for others only if they could in turn benefit from other people’s care. This distinguishes the inclusive from the truly benevolent, who would remain benevolent regardless of how other people treat them. Understood, as it is argued here that we should, the Mohist doctrine of inclusive care provides a compelling account of how we should concern ourselves with one another’s well-being in a society in which caring attitudes are sufficiently widespread.

How Meaning Moves: Tan Sitong on Borrowing across Cultures
Leigh K. Jenco, 92

Much recent comparative political theory and philosophy engages the substantive ideas of historically marginalized thought traditions, but ignores the methodological insights that have structured cross-cultural thinking in diverse times and places. In contrast, this essay examines the cross-cultural methodology of Tan Sitong, an influential Chinese reformer of the Qing dynasty who thought critically and carefully about his country’s engagement with Western knowledge. Tan’s work draws attention to how dynamic and plural meaning (dao) in any society is embedded and produced through externally observable practices and institutions (qi) that can be replicable in other communities. Working from these metaphysical assumptions, he draws attention to the possibility of “authentic” imitation of foreign ways of life. His ambitions to authenticity, however, do not affirm a cultural essence so much as they recognize the process of meaning-production as driven by a necessary tension between continuity or replication, on the one hand, and innovation and interpretation, on the other. Tan therefore provides an important corrective to contemporary accounts that emphasizes how the emergent and hybrid character of cultural constructs tends to ignore the ways in which foreign learning can be a site of discipline as well as a target of inclusion.

FEATURE REVIEW

The Centrality of Karma in Early Buddhism, a review of What the Buddha Thought, by Richard Gombrich
William Walters, 114

BOOK REVIEWS

Imperial-Way Zen: Ichikawa Hakugen’s Critique and Lingering Questions for Buddhist Ethics, by Christopher Ives
Reviewed by James Mark Shields, 128

Ritual and Deference: Extending Chinese Philosophy in a Comparative Context, by Robert Cummings Neville
Reviewed by Sor-hoon Tan, 131

Rorty, Pragmatism and Confucianism, edited by Yong Huang
Reviewed by Andrew Lambert, 134

The Jews as a Chosen People: Tradition and Transformation, by S. Leyla Gürkan
Reviewed by Paul E. Nahme, 139

Fathoming the Cosmos and Ordering the World: The Yijing (I-Ching, or Classic of Changes) and Its Evolution in China, by Richard J. Smith
Reviewed by Tze-ki Hon, 144

The Chinese Aesthetic Tradition, by Li Zehou
Reviewed by Marthe Chandler, 147

BOOKS RECEIVED

Books Received, 151

“国际四书学学术研讨会”
2012年4月28日至4月29日
International Symposium on Four Books
April 28—29, 2012

The International Symposium on Four Books will be held in Beijing, China, during April 28—29, 2012, under the auspices of Journal of Chinese Philosophy and the School of Classical Chinese Learning （国学院）of Renmin University of China. You shall register on the 27th.

The Four Books (in the learning order of Daxue, Zhongyong, Lunyu and Mengzi) represents the Confucian mainstream tradition of philosophical and political thought for over one thousand years in China and other areas in East Asia.  It has held supreme authority in both the intellectual and social life of China until modern period of 1919 when Confucianism was discredited. However after eclipsing nearly 100 years, Confucianism has been slowly reinstalled as the Chinese representative ideology.  Consequently，the Four Books gain wider attention among scholars and the public again.  It becomes obvious that if we wish to know Chinese culture and philosophy we cannot ignore the study of the Four Books which constitute the foundation and fountainhead of Confucianism.

A proper understanding of the Four Books incur many interesting scholarly questions which include:  What is the unifying theme of the Four Books？What are the differentiating views among the Four Books?  What is the best way of integrating the ideas of Four Books without suppressing their differences? Why is Xunzi excluded from the central learning of the Four Books and how compatible is it with the Four Books？ What is the canonical status of the Four Books?  How to compare it to the canonical tradition of the West?  How and whether the Four Books can be taught as canonical literature in the world?  In particular，how are the Four Books to be incorporated in the educational curricula of the contemporary academe and universities?

In light of these questions, we call for papers on themes of the following:

1.      Textual and Commentaries studies of the Four Books
2.      Interpretation and Hermeneutics of the Four Books
3.      Influence of Four Books in Chinese society and Chinese culture
4.      Philosophy in the Four Books and core values in the Chinese ethics
5.      Comparative studies including religious and aesthetic studies
6.      Four Books and contemporary philosophy and education in China

As you are known to work in an area related to the above questions of the Four Books, you are cordially invited to participate in this Symposium and to present an academic paper on a relevant theme or topic. Your room and board during the conference are covered by the Symposium, but your travel from your hometown to Beijing will have to be borne by yourself.  Hence you are encouraged to apply to your institution for financial support.  All titles, abstracts and full articles are to be submitted before or no later than April 10, 2012.  For inquiries, please forward them to the following address.

Linyu Gu, Ph. D. in Philosophy
Journal of Chinese Philosophy
E-mail: linyu@hawaii.edu

Bill writes:

Paul’s list of five basic convictions in Confucianism has an elegant unity, in that its points center on two main ideas: “morality” and “perfection” – or on the one idea, “moral perfection.” But I wonder about the extent to which this is idea was shared by Confucius. There is at least some prima facie reason to suspect that the very idea may be profoundly at odds with Confucius’ views.

I don’t have an opinion yet about whether he actually did hold this idea, or about whether there is significant evidence either way; I haven’t thought about this question before today, nor read the Analects with the question in mind, or indeed read the Analects recently, so maybe this elaborate comment has an easy and obvious answer. Here I’ll just set out the prima facie reason to wonder.

The following oversimple view is familiar in the West: Morality has two parts. One part consists of fairly clear rules (e.g. don’t kill people, don’t steal) that can and should be completely obeyed, and that can be associated with the terms ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. Some of these rules may be associated with particular offices or positions, e.g. a borrower must return what she borrowed, and a captain must go down with the ship. The other part of morality consists of what might be called scalar values, and are more properly associated with such words as ‘bad’ and ‘better’ and ‘good’ and ‘excellent’. Examples might include virtues, like rén, wisdom, or courage; or other things like moral self-cultivation, working for peace, or succeeding in benefitting others. The more of the scalar things you do the better, other things being equal, and there may be no such thing as doing them completely or all the way.

At first glance the notion of moral perfection or flawlessness is more at home in the former part of morality; or in morality conceived on the model of that part. Here are three reasons. (1) We tend to find clear rules plausibly obligatory only when they are not beyond most relevant people’s powers to obey completely. (2) Also, human society seems to need a groundwork of clear rules to ground security, peace and cooperation, rules we can pretty much count on people to obey; and the analogous point is true on a smaller scale, e.g. in any particular organization. So it is common (if perhaps fallacious) to think of the rule part of morality as the elementary part, the part for total obedience; and the scalar part of morality as the proper focus for high aspiration. (3) Perhaps most importantly, complete obedience to any attractive set of rules is pretty much guaranteed to be conceptually possible, i.e. conceivable. In setting out the rules, one is automatically describing complete obedience, i.e. perfection by those standards. Nothing of the sort is true for scalar values. There is nothing unusual about holding a scalar value such that the idea of complete success or perfection is just as nonsensical as the idea of the greatest whole number. Hence one might well associate the idea of scalar morality, or high moral aspiration, with the rejection of the very idea of moral perfection.

It is popular recently to associate Confucianism, or at least Confucius, with “virtue ethics,” which is naturally associated with scalar values (better/worse rather than right/wrong), and with conceiving the whole of morality on the model of the scalar part. For that reason alone I think we should be careful about attributing the idea of moral perfection to Confucius and to Confucianism in general.

Not that a scalar moralist can’t believe in perfection. Indeed, virtue theory is sometimes associated with a natural teleology whereby morality is thought to be about trying to realize some ideal form for our species, or something like that, as Aristotle and Mengzi seem to have thought; and this view makes prima facie sense of the idea of moral perfection, at least in the abstract.

Still, even that kind of view can have difficulty with the idea of perfection. Think of the idea of actually drawing a perfectly straight or perfectly circular line, with pencil on paper. On the one hand there is in some sense a clear concept of perfection, and it is intelligible to aim at those perfections in our drawing. Those are the targets we should have our mental eyes on, not the drawing of an only slightly wiggly line. On the other hand, we just as readily grant that achieving such perfection is utterly impossible for anyone, even with compass and square. (I guess the image 不逾距 from LY 2.4 is not about ideals or models, but about boundaries that one can stay well within, as one may obey clear rules.)

The drawing problem arises from a tension between the ideals and the matter. Aristotle was troubled by a similar tension, I think, between his abstract ideals (the contemplative knower, e.g. God) and the limitations of the human species qua matter for that form. More familiarly, he may never have resolved the deep tension among his picture of individual perfection, his notion of humanity as an essentially social species (almost like bees), and his picture of a community’s perfection. Off the top of my head I don’t recall what signs there might be of either sort of tension in the Analects. I imagine Bryan Van Norden must have discussed such things in his book Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism in Early Chinese Philosophy, but I forget.

There is, however, a different sort of potential tension in the Analects that arises from a lack: Confucius seems to have lacked a term equivalent to our ‘morality’ (and most of what he says in the Analects may be specifically about the vocation of public service or even the role of ruler rather than about norms applicable across the board). I think he may pretty much have the idea of morality anyway, and I’ve argued in print that he does. But if we find him talking about perfection in one or another part or aspect of what we call morality, we can’t simply infer that he has thought of moral perfection. For one thing, moral perfection might involve trade-offs, a balance among morality’s parts; e.g. one might think morality counsels the occasional lie. For another thing, even if there is perfection in one part of morality, there may be another part of morality regarding which perfection makes no sense.

So: is the idea of moral perfection evidenced in or alien to the Analects? Anyone?

Theme / 討論主題

“Philosophical Methodology:
From the Vantage Point of Comparative Philosophy”
“哲學方法論﹕從比較哲學的觀點看”

(2012-1-17 version)

Academic Organizer: International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy (ISCWP)

學術組織方:     國際中西哲學比較研究學會

Host & Co-sponsor: Center for Comparative Philosophy & Institute of Foreign Philosophy, Peking University, Beijing, China

東道主/共同贊助方: 北京大學比較哲學研究中心/北京大學外國哲學研究所

Co-sponsor:    Center for Comparative Philosophy, San Jose State University, USA

共同贊助方:     美國加州圣荷塞州立大學比較哲學研究中心

Time:              22nd June 2012, Friday (tentatively)

時間：             2012年6月22日, 星期五(暂定)

Location:         Conference Room of Institute of Foreign Philosophy (Room 227, Old Chemistry Building), Peking University, Beijing, China

地點：             北京大學外國哲學研究所會議室 (老化學樓227室)

Discussion language: English and/or Chinese

學術討論語言：英文/中文

The 2012 Term of the ISCWP’s “Beijing Roundtable on Contemporary Philosophy” workshop series will be a half-day (tentatively) workshop on the theme “Philosophical Methodology: From the Vantage Point of Comparative Philosophy”. Its aim is to have an in-depth critical examination of how the vantage point and methodology of comparative philosophy can effectively serve as one general methodological approach in philosophy for the sake of development of contemporary philosophy and in view of the reflective practice of the ISCWP in the past decade since its inception in 2002.

Especially since the first decade of this century, comparative philosophy, as understood and practiced in a philosophically interesting way, has undergone significant development in its identity, coverage and mission. Comparative philosophy, instead of being a local subfield of philosophy, has become one exciting general front of philosophical exploration that is primarily concerned with how distinct approaches and resources from different philosophical traditions (both culture/region-associated and style/orientation-associated philosophical traditions) can learn from and constructively engage with each other to jointly contribute to our understandings and treatments of a series of philosophical issues and topics in various areas of philosophy, which can be jointly concerned through appropriate philosophical interpretation and a broader philosophical vantage point.

The 2012 term of “Beijing Roundbtable” emphasizes an in-depth meta-methodological discussion of relevant theoretic points involved in the vantage point and methodology of comparative philosophy as one effective general methodology in the constructive-engagement oriented philosophical exploration.

The format of the 2012 workshop will start with a methodological précis of the collective efforts of the ISCWP on the foregoing front in the past decade, which as a target of reflective criticism is followed by a critical-discussion panel on the theme. In view of this format, submissions to the 2012 term of “Beijing Roundtable” can be either a systematic reflection or a shorter critical piece (in English or Chinese, together with a 150-250 word abstract in English) and may be submitted electronically (MS Word file, single-spaced) by 1^st May 2012 to the review team c/o Bo Mou, ISCWP coordinator for the 2012 term of Beijing Roundtable, at bo.mou@sjsu.edu. The length and format of prospective presentations of accepted pieces will be announced, being sensitive to several relevant situational considerations for the sake of most effectively carrying out the critical discussion on the theme.

Any interested ISCWP members and other interested colleagues are welcome to participate in this workshop. For further information concerning its academic coordination, contact Bo Mou; for further information concerning its host organization, contact Xianglong Zhang (xlzhang@pku.edu.cn) and Linhe Han (hanlinhe@pku.edu.cn), the Host representatives.

Editor’s Words

Comparative Philosophy 3:1 (2012): 1-2.

Kristie Dotson (Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Michigan State University, USA):
“How is this Paper Philosophy”
Comparative Philosophy 3:1 (2012): 3-29.
Abstract:
This paper answers a call made by Anita Allen to genuinely assess whether the field of philosophy has the capacity to sustain the work of diverse peoples. By identifying a pervasive culture of justification within professional philosophy, I gesture to the ways professional philosophy is not an attractive working environment for many diverse practitioners.  As a result of the downsides of the culture of justification that pervades professional philosophy, I advocate that the discipline of professional philosophy be cast according to a culture of praxis. Finally, I provide a comparative exercise using Graham Priest’s definition of philosophy and Audre Lorde’s observations of the limitations of philosophical theorizing to show how these two disparate accounts can be understood as philosophical engagement with a shift to a culture of praxis perspective.
Key Words: professional philosophy, diversity, culture of justification, culture of praxis, exceptionalism, sense of incongruence, Audre Lorde, Graham Priest, Anita Allen, Gayle Salamon

Special Topic: Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy in Buddhist Tradition and Contemporary Philosophy

Lajos L. Brons (Researcher, Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, Nihon University / Center for Advanced Research on Logic and Sensibility, Keio University, Tokyo, Japan):
“Dharmakīrti, Davidson, and Knowing Reality”
Comparative Philosophy 3:1 (2012): 30-57.
Abstract:
If we distinguish phenomenal effects from their noumenal causes, the former being our conceptual(ized) experiences, the latter their grounds or causes in reality ‘as it is’ independent of our experience, then two contradictory positions with regards to the relationship between these two can be distinguished: either phenomena are identical with their noumenal causes, or they are not. Davidson is among the most influential modern defenders of the former position, metaphysical non-dualism. Dharmakīrti’s strict distinction between ultimate and conventional reality, on the other hand, may be one of the most rigorously elaborated theories of the opposite position, metaphysical dualism. Despite this fundamental difference, their theories about the connection between phenomena and their noumenal causes are surprisingly similar in important respects. Both Dharmakīrti in his theory of ‘apoha’ and Davidson in his theory of ‘triangulation’ argued that the content of words or concepts depends on a process involving at least two communicating beings and shared noumenal stimuli. The main point of divergence is the nature of classification, but ultimately Dharmakīrti’s and Davidson’s conclusions on the noumenal – phenomenal relationship turn out to complementary more than contradictory, and an integrative reconstruction suggests a ‘middle path’ between dualism and non-dualism.
keywords: Dharmakīrti, Donald Davidson, apoha, triangulation, reality, meta-ontology, subjectivity, metaphysical dualism

Jeremy E. Henkel (Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Wofford College, USA):
“How to Avoid Solipsism While Remaining an Idealist: Lessons from Berkeley and Dharmakīrti”
Comparative Philosophy 3:1 (2012): 58-73.
Abstract:
This essay examines the strategies that Berkeley and Dharmakīrti utilize to deny that idealism entails solipsism. Beginning from similar arguments for the non-existence of matter, the two philosophers employ markedly different strategies for establishing the existence of other minds. This difference stems from their responses to the problem of intersubjective agreement. While Berkeley’s reliance on his Cartesian inheritance does allow him to account for intersubjective agreement without descending into solipsism, it nevertheless prevents him from establishing the existence of other finite minds.  I argue that Dharmakīrti, in accounting for intersubjective agreement causally, is able to avoid Berkeley’s shortcoming. I conclude by considering a challenge to Dharmakīrti’s use of inference that Ratnakīrti, a Buddhist successor of Dharmakīrti, advances in his “Disproof of the Existence of Other Minds” and briefly exploring a possible response that someone who wants to advocate an idealist position could give.
keywords: Berkeley, Dharmakīrti, Ratnakīrti, idealism, solipsism, philosophy of mind

Howard J. Curzer (Professor, Department of Philosophy, Texas Tech University, USA):
“Benevolent Government Now”
Comparative Philosophy 3:1 (2012): 74-85.
Abstract:
Mencian benevolent government intervenes dramatically in many ways in the marketplace in order to secure the material well-being of the population, especially the poor and disadvantaged. Mencius considers this sort of intervention to be appropriate not just occasionally when dealing with natural disasters, but regularly. Furthermore, Mencius recommends shifting from regressive to progressive taxes. He favors reduction of inequality so as to reduce corruption of government by the wealthy, and opposes punishment for people driven to crime by destitution. Mencius thinks government should try to improve the character of the population by preventing or relieving poverty, by setting a good example, and by teaching people to respect and care for each other. He considers a government to be legitimate only if it has the support of the people. His recommended foreign policy is approximately the same as his recommended domestic policy: set a good example and enhance the material wellbeing and moral values of one’s own people so that they will enthusiastically support their country, while foreigners will long to immigrate. These are policies of today’s left. Mencius was a radical reformer in his own day. His description of benevolent government shows that he is an extreme liberal by contemporary standards, too.
Key Words: Mencius, benevolent government, liberal, conservative, regulation, taxation, punishment, legitimacy, civil liberties, foreign policy